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Abstract
This article presents problems associated with the development of competition on 
the Polish energy market in the context of tariffs and pricing. National standards 
are set against the background of European legislation and the activities of the 
Energy Regulatory Office. The thesis is that the tariffs concerning distribution 
should be approved by the President of this authority because it is a natural 
monopoly, something the authors demonstrate in the following part of the article. 
However, the tariffs concerning selling should be free from confirmation even for 
households because this is a typical market. The authors do not ignore legal analysis 
and practical issues.
Résumé
Cet article présente les problèmes associés avec le développement de la concurrence 
dans le marché de l’énergie en Pologne, dans le contexte des tarifs et des prix. Les 
standards nationaux sont présentés dans le contexte de la législation européenne 
 * Dr. Marzena Czarnecka, Legal Counsel, Ph.D. in Economics, Lecturer at the University 
of Economics in Katowice, Partner in the Law Firm T. Ogłódek, M.Czarnecka. 
** Tomasz Ogłódek, Legal Counsel, economist, Partner in the Law Firm T. Ogłódek, 
M. Czarnecka. 
 YEARBOOK
of ANTITRUST
and REGULATORY
 STUDIES 
www.yars.wz.uw.edu.pl
Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies,
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management
www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl
Peer-reviewed  scientific  periodical, 
focusing  on  legal  and  economic 
issues of antitrust and regulation. 
Creative Commons Attribution-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 Poland License.
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
152  MARZENA CZARNECKA, TOMASZ OGŁÓDEK
et des activités de l’autorité de régulation de l’énergie (ERA). La thèse est que les 
tarifs concernant la distribution devront être acceptées par le Président de l’ERA, 
parce que c’est un monopole naturel, ce qui sera expliqué par les auteurs dans la 
partie suivante de l’article, mais les tarifs concernant la vente devront être libre, 
même pour les ménages, parce que c’est un marché typique. Les auteurs n’ignorent 
pas l’analyse de la loi et les aspects pratiques. 
Classifications and key words: energy law, tariff, energy market.
I. Introduction 
The purpose of the article is to present the influence of tariff-setting on 
the energy market in light of national and community judicial judgements. 
The authors have not made an economic analysis, and only within the limited 
extent of this article consider the influence of instruments of an administrative 
character in the form of tariff approval on the development of competition 
on the energy market.
Many directives issued within the structure of the European Union (EU) 
are connected with the liberalization of the energy market. This obviously 
has a direct effect on national legislation. Energy companies operating on 
the market aim to maximize their revenues, but they are restricted in doing 
so by state institutions and legislation. The literature distinguishes various 
types of regulations and differing motives for its introduction. One may 
mention regulation for economic reasons concerning the control of prices, 
the conditions for entry and exit from the sector, type of products, etc. – or 
regulation connected with social welfare, undertaken in the form of safety, 
quality, environmental protectio n, and consumer protection requirements, etc. 
Among the motives justifying regulation we may mention market inadequacies 
(ineffectiveness) related to external effects on product markets and production 
factors, the problem of private and public assets, the problem of natural 
monopolies, the requirement of supplying ordinary services at sensible prices, 
and political maneuvering in the conditions of public choice. The process of 
regulation is used by the state for achieving various functions, such as creating 
a legal basis for the operation of the market economy. From the times of 
Adam Smith, the problem of determining the compass of state regulation 
has been a focus of expert debate1 as well as legislative efforts. In the scope 
1 A. Zielińska-Głębocka, Podstawowe założenia teorii konkurencji [in:] Konkurencja, 
Z. Brodecki [ed.], LexisNexis, Warszawa 2004, pp. 48–49. 
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of the electricity and natural gas directives2, energy companies have been 
subject to regulation through unbundling – in other words, separation of the 
transmission and distribution activities of a network business from its activities 
in production and supply.
The main idea of unbundling was to mitigate the incentives for discriminating 
against competitors, and to increase equality in access to the market and 
competition. Among others matters, the assumption of the electricity and 
market directives was also the elimination of discrimination both in the 
area of defining electricity and gas prices in tariffs3, which shall guarantee 
nondiscriminatory access to the energy system for all users. 
There are two different types of tariffs: (i) distribution tariffs – fee for the 
energy transfer and (ii) end-user tariffs – currently only for households. Tariffs 
concerning distribution and transmission should be approved by the President 
of the Energy Regulatory Office (Urząd Regulacji Energetyki; hereafter, URE) 
because it is a natural monopoly, as we prove in the following part of this 
article. However, the tariffs concerning price cap for households should 
be free from the obligation of receiving an approval granted by the URE 
President. In conclusion, it is our opinion that excessive state interference in 
the regulation of prices for selling energy and in distribution does not provide 
improved protection for consumers in the long term. 
II. The tariff issue in Poland: a general depiction 
In connection with the interference of the state in the energy market 
the concept of the tariff was introduced to the Act of 10 April 1997 – the 
Energy Law (hereafter, the Energy Law)4. According to Article 3 item 17 of 
the Energy Law, a tariff is the collection of prices and fee rates, as well as 
2 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in energy and repealing Directive 2003/54/
EC, OJ (2009) L 211/55; Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/73/EC 
of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal natural gas and repealing Directive 
2003/55/EC, OJ [2009] L 211/94; Directive 2003/54/WE of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of the 26 July 2003 concerning common principles in the internal electric energy market 
and revoking directive 96/92/WE (OJ [2003] L 176/37); Directive 2003/55/WE of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of the 26 July 2003 concerning common principles in the internal 
natural gas market and revoking directive 98/30/WE (OJ [2003] L 176/57). 
3 B. Nowak, Wewnętrzny rynek energii w Unii Europejskiej, C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2009, 
p. 123 ff.
4 Unified text available at http://www.ure.gov.pl/portal/pl/25/17/Ustawa_z_dnia_10_
kwietnia_1997_r__Prawo_energetyczne.html.
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the conditions of their application, drawn up by the energy enterprise and 
introduced, as being in force for the recipients specified in them in the manner 
specified in the Act, that is in the form of administrative decision. These are 
tariffs which are approved by the URE President, although some of them 
may not be approved under the provisions of the Energy Law. It is necessary 
to agree with the position of H. Palarz5, that fees are treated in the literature 
as a public rent collected from subjects in connection with mutual provisions 
on behalf of those subjects, assuming the form of public services, pursued 
in principle by enforcement. In the Energy Law the concept of fees is used 
in another meaning than public legal rents and applies to some of the price 
components of an energy enterprise. Obviously the question arises as to the 
legal nature of the establishment of prices. Furthermore, according to the 
ruling of the Supreme Court of April 11, 20036 the tariff of fuels corresponds 
to the requirements specified in Article 47 item 1 of the Energy Law and is 
classified in a standardized contract.7 This means that the text of the tariff 
(with any specific obligations or possibilities) should be an integral part of 
any agreement. 
III. The regulator’s role in energy tariff regulation
In our opinion the activity of the URE President, as a substitute for 
a  competitive market, should be obligatory, especially in markets where 
a natural monopoly exists, such as the energy market. However even here 
a demarcation line shall be drawn between transmission and distribution which 
require regulation and supply of energy to customers, and which shall be 
left to market forces of demand and supply. Otherwise destabilization of the 
market might ensue.
As confirmed by the URE President in his Statement of June 28, 2001 
‘The general relief from the duty to approve a tariff issued on electricity 
generation and electricity trading companies with no electricity distribution 
activity’ (‘Statement of June 28, 2001’)8 was legally effective. Pursuant to 
5 H. Palarz, Prawo energetyczne z komentarzem, Gdańsk 2004, p. 33.
6 V CK 38/2002.
7 This position was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the ruling of the Civil Division 
of the Supreme Court that the tariff, approved by the Energy Regulation Authority is not an 
administrative act, it is within the application of Article 384 of the Polish Civil Code, which does 
not contain a closed catalogue and is a standard V CK 855/2004 (Gazeta Prawna 2005/134 p. 17).
8 Stanowisko Prezesa URE w sprawie zwolnienia przedsiębiorstw energetycznych zajmu-
jących się wytwarzaniem i obrotem energią elektryczną z obowiązku przedkładania taryf do 
zatwierdzenia (28.06.2001), www.ure.gov.pl.
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Article 49 item 1 of the Energy Law the URE President is empowered to grant 
a relief from the duty to submit tariffs, if the market where a particular energy 
enterprise operates is competitive. The URE President is also empowered to 
withdraw its relief from the tariff approval duty, provided that the reasons for 
the earlier issued relief no longer exist. What this means is that that today’s 
energy market cannot be less competitive than in 2001. 
It must be noted that pursuant to Article 47 item 1 of the Energy Law the 
URE President approves tariff (tariff application) submitted by the energy 
undertaking, but he is not allowed to define the content of the application. 
The tariff approval procedure includes only two possible outcomes: a decision 
approving tariff or a decision refusing to approve tariff.
According to Article 47 item 1 of the Energy Law tariffs for natural gas 
and electric power are subject to approval by the URE President. Energy 
enterprises prepare tariff application themselves or at the demand of the URE 
President. Failure to submit an application in the event of a summons by the 
URE President is subject to a penalty in the procedure of Article 56 item 
1 point 5a of the Energy Law. Furthermore according to the judgement of 
the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny; hereafter, 
NSA) of March 31, 20099 such summons of an energy enterprise to submit 
tariffs, made by the URE President, is not an act or action within the scope 
of public administration concerning authorizations or obligations arising from 
legal regulations and thus is not subject to appeal. 
In the tariff application the energy enterprise proposes the period for which 
the tariff shall be in force. Indication of the validity period of the tariff by 
the energy enterprise (the applicant) in our opinion should not exceed three 
years. In the Energy Law the legislator accepted the principle that the period 
in force not exceeding three years should be dependent upon fulfillment of 
the premise defined in this regulation. The URE President is authorized 
to demand changes to tariffs and to the premises (reasons and conditions) 
applied in the application, e.g., in a situation where a new tariff might lead 
to the reduction of rates of prices and fees. Undoubtedly the fact remains, 
as confirmed by the Supreme Court in its judgment of August 5, 200410, that 
the obligation of an energy enterprise to submit to the procedure of tariff 
verification on the basis of Article 47 of the Energy Law is an obligation of 
a public-legal nature obliging it to apply prices according to approved tariffs. 
The URE President confirms a tariff or refuses its approval in the event 
that it does not fulfill the requirements as specified in the regulations of the 
Energy Law. Proceedings in the case of approval of tariffs are subject to the 
general principles defined in the Code of Administrative Procedure (Kodeks 
 9 II GSK 831/08. 
10 III CK 349/03.
YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
156  MARZENA CZARNECKA, TOMASZ OGŁÓDEK
Postępowania Administracyjnego; hereafter, CAP), meaning that procedures in 
such matters should be completed within the period envisaged for arranging 
matters by the provisions of this Act11. This is explicitly indicated in Article 
30 item 112 of the Energy Law, which in proceedings conducted before the 
URE President that orders the application of the provisions of CAP13. The 
URE President in the process of the proceedings for approving tariffs makes 
an assessment of whether the given tariff has been established in accord with 
the legal regulations. The boundaries of interference of the Authority in this 
extent are defined by the provisions of Article 23 item 2 point 2 and 3 in 
conjunction with Article 47 and 49 of the Energy Law in conjunction with the 
issues executive ordinances based on Article 46. 
According to Article 47 item 2a of the Energy Law the URE President, on 
the application of energy enterprises, can approve for a period not exceeding 
3 years, a tariff containing prices and fee rates whose amount shall not exceed 
prices and fee rates in force prior to its submission to the URE President, if 
the following combined conditions are fulfilled, i.e.: 
1) tariff conditions of application of prices and fee rates have not been 
subject to change;
2) documented (and described in the application) external changes of 
conditions to the business activity of the energy enterprise, and which 
concern the tariff, do not justify the reduction of prices and fee rates 
contained in the tariff;
11 Not completing procedures in one of the periods, referred to in Article 35 of CAP or 
lack of notification directed to parties according to art. 36 § 1, may result in the resorting by 
one party to legal measures to combat the inertia of a public authority, including a complaint 
about inactivity to the Provincial Administrative Court (Article 3 § 1 point 8 of the Act of 30 
August 2002 – Law on Procedure before Administration Courts). (...) Additionally it would be 
necessary to consider, when the situation in which the tariff for various reasons would not be 
confirmed within the period envisaged in Article 35 CAP, might give rise to responsibility for 
damages of the party of the President of the Authority. Article 77 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland states that everyone is entitled to compensation for damages inflicted by 
the action of a public administrative authority, which contravenes the law. This constitutional 
principle is codified in the regulations of Article 417–4172 of the Act of the 23 April 1964 – Civil 
Code. According to the wording of Article 417 1 § 3, if damages are inflicted by the failure to 
issue a ruling or decision, if the obligation to issue them is envisaged in a legal regulation, its 
remedy may be demanded after confirmation in the appropriate procedure of lack of conformity 
with the law in the lack of issue of ruling or decision, unless separate regulations determine 
otherwise. In particular sites damages may arise in the situation, where a new tariff envisaged 
an increase in prices and fee rates and the President the Office would confirm it with delay....”. 
For more see: T. Dec, G. Słowiński, ‘Ile potrzeba czasu na zatwierdzenie taryfy?’ (2005) 6 
Biuletyn URE. 
12 Journal of Laws of 2000 No. 98, item 1071 with amendments.   
13 B. Adamiak, J. Borkowski, Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego. Komentarz, C.H. Beck, 
Warszawa 2005. 
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3) for the period proposed in the application of the validity of the tariff 
or part of this period a correction coefficient has not been established, 
defining the projected correction of the operating efficiency of the 
energy enterprise and changes in the conditions of the performance by 
the enterprise of a given type of commercial activity. 
In this case two doubts arise: the first concerns the concept of prices and 
fee rates not exceeding amounts in force prior to the submission of tariffs to 
the URE President. One must therefore assume that these are prices from the 
last tariff approved by the URE President. It is obvious that all the premises 
to define are subject to evaluation by the URE President. According to Article 
7 of CAP, during administrative proceedings the administrative authorities 
such as URE President are guardians of legality and take all steps essential 
to the precise clarification of facts and to the settlement of the case, which 
is equitable to the public interest. Before issuing a decision concerning the 
approval or refusal of a tariff the URE President is obliged to exhaustively 
collect and examine all material evidence (compare Article 77 § 1 CAP). In 
the event of documented changes of external conditions in the performance 
of commercial activity by an energy enterprise the URE President may issue 
a decision on the correction coefficient, defining the projected improvement 
in the efficiency of the operation of the energy enterprise and the changes 
in the conditions of the performance by the enterprise of the given type of 
commercial activity. This has been approved by the ruling of the Supreme 
Court of 14 January 200914 according to which the decision of approval of 
electrical energy tariffs may be changed or revoked before the expiry of the 
period for which the tariff was established. 
In such a case the energy enterprise is obliged to apply prices and fee rates 
from the tariff specified in Article 47 item 2a, until application of a new tariff. 
The previous tariff shall be applied in two instances, if:
1) the decision of the URE President has not been issued or
2) appeal proceedings are in progress against the decision of the URE 
President. 
However, this tariff is not applied if the decision of the URE President 
refusing approval of the tariff is justified by the necessity of prices reduction 
and fee rates below the prices and fee rates contained in the hitherto binding 
tariff and results from documented and described changes in external 
conditions in the performance by the energy enterprise of commercial activity. 
In such a case the energy enterprise may not apply the tariff and equally may 
not apply a new tariff, because e.g., appeal proceedings are in progress. In 
14 III SK 23/08.
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such a situation the only solution appears to be to desist from the conduct of 
business activity by the energy enterprise. 
According to Article 56 Para. 1 of the Energy Law, an entity which does not 
observe the obligation to present tariffs to the URE President for approval is 
subject to an administrative fine. The Supreme Court in its judgement of April 
7, 200415 approved this position stating that a financial penalty may also be 
imposed on a person who applies prices and tariffs not approved by the URE 
President, although already presented for such approval. This means that in such 
an instance, an energy enterprise may apply neither an unapproved tariff nor 
a tariff applicable to this time without being in jeopardy of a financial penalty. 
A possible solution in such a situation would be the legal regulation of such 
situations in agreements between the energy enterprise and the recipient16.
According to Article 47 of the Energy Law the URE President announces 
in the URE Bulletin, at the cost of the energy enterprise, the approved tariffs 
for fuel gases and electric power. The tariff may be in force not earlier than 
14 and not later than 45 days from the date of its publication. This is not 
a rigidly defined vacatio legis of a new tariff, but the legislator has defined 
the time-frame for the inauguration of the new tariff. Obviously it is to the 
benefit of the recipients to acquaint themselves with the content of the new 
tariff. Nevertheless the parties, within the framework of mutual relations, are 
authorized to indicate another period for the inauguration of a tariff17. The 
aforementioned procedure concerns the approval of tariffs. It also raises the 
basic question of the role of the regulator in the extent of the possibility of 
non-execution of the obligation to approved tariffs. 
The URE President is authorized to free an energy enterprise from the 
obligation to submit tariffs for approval, if he states that the energy enterprise 
operates in competitive conditions, on the basis of Article 49 item 1 of the 
Energy Law.18 The freeing referred to, may concern a specified part of the 
15 III SK 30/04.
16 Compare with the judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of October 2, 2003 
(V CK 228/2002), which approved and announced in the procedure of the specified Energy 
Law, the tariff for energy in force from the expiry of the period defined in Article 47 item 4, 
unless the parties to the sale of energy agreement unless the parties of a power sales agreement 
defined the other terms of changes in prices and rates, or other means of settlement. 
17 Compare judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of October 2, 2003 (V CK 
228/2002). See also: M. Czarnecka, T. Ogłódek Prawo energetyczne. Komentarz, C.H. Beck War-
szawa 2009; R. Taradejna, Charakter prawny cen i stawek opłat zawartych w taryfie przedsię-
biorstw energetycznych, (2003) 1 Biuletyn URE www.ure.gov.pl; R. Taradejna, A. Tutak, Problemy 
i pułapki administracyjno-prawnego zatwierdzania taryf przedsiębiorstw energetycznych, (2005) 6 
Biuletyn URE www.ure.gov.pl; D. Nowak, ‘Ceny sztywne czy maksymalne?’ (1999) 5 Biuletyn URE.
18 The quoted legal standard became the basis for the URE President’s statement of December 
14, 2000 on recognition of the electric power exchange market as a competitive market, thus 
releasing energy enterprises selling electric power through the market for goods from the obligation 
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operations conducted by the energy enterprise, in the extent to which such 
operations are conducted in a competitive market.19 With regard to the above, 
one may accept the interpretation that the release may apply to a specified 
type of business activity conducted by an energy enterprise and thus may 
refer to a specified group of tariff recipients or also apply to a specified 
geographical area. It is characteristic of the legislator to use the definition 
‘competitive conditions’ instead of ‘competitive market’. Use of this somewhat 
less rigorous clause gives the URE President greater possibilities in making 
use of this authorization. 
It must be noted that the URE President still keeps to his stance pending 
the procedure of tariff approval. This will be actionable and can challenged 
with an appeal in the Court for Protection of Competition and Customers (Sąd 
Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, CCP Court). The CCP Court 
could include an immediate enforcement clause. If the court judgment is not 
acceptable for the energy enterprise, it may appeal to the Court of Appeals in 
Warsaw and finally lodge a cassation procedure to the Supreme Court. 
This situation means that provisions for unbundling should clearly indicate 
that access tariffs for distribution service accepted by the URE President as 
his domain shall be separated from price caps – tariffs set on prices charged to 
end-users (consumers). The latter shall remain subject to market conditions, 
and the role of the URE President shall be reduced to a minimum. Apart from 
this the division of tariffs set for particular group of consumers is significant 
– such as for households, small business, or large companies. It cannot be 
doubted that the intention of the URE President in the areas of natural 
of application of tariffs. On the June 28, 2001 the President of the Authority issued the Statement 
on release of energy undertaking generating and selling of electricity from the obligation to submit 
tariffs for confirmation (Statement of June 18, 2001), on the basis of which he released energy 
enterprises undertaking production and distribution of electric power from the obligation to submit 
tariffs for confirmation (with the exception of associated power producers and energy enterprises 
simultaneously possessing concessions for electric power sale and sending or distributing electric 
power, that is distribution companies. On September 23, 2004 the URE President issued equally 
on the basis of Article 49 item 1 of Energy Law, an announcement on the strength of which 
he released energy enterprises undertaking associated energy production from the obligation of 
submission of tariffs from January 1, 2005 for electric power for confirmation recognizing that the 
producers of associated electric power operate in competitive circumstances. On October 31, 2007 
the URE President issued the Statement of URE President concerning the release of energy enterprises 
possessing a concession for the sale of electric power from the obligation of submission of tariffs for 
confirmation (hereinafter, the Statement of 31 October 2007). With reference to the preceding 
statements, the Statement of 31 October 2007 constituted only the notification of release of all 
energy enterprises possessing concessions for the sale of electric power from the obligation of 
submission for confirmation of tariffs for electric power in the sale of electric power. 
19 F. Elżanowski, Polityka energetyczna. Prawne instrumenty realizacji, LexisNexis, Warszawa 
2008, p. 56 ff. 
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monopolies and network enterprises should be the restoration of market 
equilibrium through the prevention of the negative effects of a monopoly. 
The task performed by the URE President as a substitute for a competitive 
market shall be that of the requirement to achieve such a regulation of prices 
as would be established by the market in conditions excluding the existence 
of monopolies, simultaneously with regard to the principles of energy security 
and continuity of energy supply.20 However, the natural monopoly in principle 
primarily concerns network enterprises.21
A natural monopoly exists when the supply of product or service is limited to 
only one enterprise. ‘most frequently this exists in the sphere of public utilities, 
such as electricity supply, (…) It is stated by some that state interference in 
price-fixing leads to reduced economic efficiency. (…).’22 Whether the given 
business activity constitutes a natural monopoly depends on the combination 
of technical conditions, costs and consumer demands. It is generally accepted 
that the supply of electric power or natural gas by means of a network has the 
traits of a natural monopoly because the parties, apart from agreements of 
provision of distribution services, are permanently connected with each other 
by a permanent (most frequently capital intensive) connection.23 As a result, 
the power of the URE President to accept tariffs is logical and required.
IV. Competition in the energy market and price regulation
In case of vertical integration where a competitive business of energy 
sale is integrated with a regulated business (distribution and transmission of 
energy) it would seem to be rational to maintain that those energy enterprises 
undertaking sales of electric power and natural gas should be released from 
the obligation of tariff approval. This is because this market, in keeping with 
the principle of third party access (TPA principle), is competitive and the 
buyer has the right to chose and change its supplier freely. 
 Generally, this position is supported by the URE President, who has issued 
the applicable announcements and positions releasing sales enterprises from 
20 E. Nojszewska, Podstawy ekonomii, Warszawa 1998, p. 134.
21 P. Bogusławski, Taryfowanie ciepła – wymóg urzędniczy czy ekonomiczna konieczność? 
(2008) 6 Biuletyn URE. 
22 M. Nasiłowski, System rynkowy. Podstawy mikro- i makroekonomii, Warszawa 1998, p. 14.
23 A. Dobroczyńska, L. Juchniewicz, Konkurencyjny rynek energii – czy i komu jest potrzebny? 
Biblioteka Regulatora www.ure.gov.pl. 
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the obligation of approval of tariffs24. Third Part Access (TPA) is a concept 
which was presented in the Energy Act of 1992 in the United States with 
relation to the national grid. As a result, the law became the basis for the 
development of competition in the US wholesale electricity market, with the 
participation of utilities, manufacturers (with no long-term contracts), as well 
as new companies trading electricity. Of course, the introduction of TPA to 
the transmission network in the US did not involve an increase in charges 
for transmission services in these networks with an additional component in 
the form of stranded costs because it was associated with the opening of the 
electricity market for customersTwo representatives, though differing in the 
cases of the TPA to the distribution networks, are the United Kingdom and 
California. The difference between these cases are that in the UK the opening 
of the electricity market to customers was combined with privatization, whereas 
in California, it followed the opening in existing conditions in privately owned 
power companies. 
As we have already mentioned, the URE President has stated his position 
in the case of recognizing the electric power exchange market as a competitive 
market, thus releasing energy enterprises selling electric power through the 
market for goods from the obligation of the approval of tariffs. On October 
31, 2007, the URE President issued a new statement deciding that the market 
in Poland was sufficiently competitive. He later changed his opinion and took 
legal action against various energy enterprises to try and force them to gain the 
authority’s approval of their tariffs. Of course all these decisions were issued 
in flagrant violation of Article 49 1 and 3 of the Energy Law because there 
was no inquiry on the cessation of the conditions justifying the exemption 
granted in the Statement of June 28, 2001. Under Article 110 of CAP, the 
URE President is bound by his Statement of 11 June 2007. However, the 
withdrawal of the exemption granted in the Statement, even if only partial, 
requires an analysis of the conditions that justified the amendment made 
by the Statement of June 28, 2001 and demonstration that those conditions 
ceased to exist later. No such analysis is a flagrant violation of Article 7, 8, 
9, 11 and 77 of CAP. This raises the question about the legitimacy of such 
proceedings and the issue of the need to respect the principle of deepening 
trust. Indeed, the principle of explaining the merits of the conditions has been 
repeatedly the subject of attention both in literature and in the jurisprudence 
24 Mapa drogowa uwolnienia cen dla wszystkich odbiorców energii elektrycznej. W drodze ku 
prawom odbiorców w sektorze energetycznym. Document prepared by the URE President, 2008 
(http://www.ure.gov.pl/ftp/Biuletyny_URE/2008/2008.03.03-biuletyn_nr2.pdf). See also Komunikat 
Prezesa URE z dnia 25 lutego 2008 r. w sprawie przesłanek uwolnienia cen energii elektrycznej 
dla odbiorców w gospodarstwach domowych (http://www.ure.gov.pl/portal/pdb/497/3032/
Komunikatw_sprawie_przeslanek_uwolnienia_cen_energii_elektrycznej_dla_odbiorcow_.html).
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of administrative law. Implementing the principles of persuasion – in the 
administrative procedure – should take place through the institution of CAP. 
‘This principle should permeate through all activities of the administration in 
the course of the entire proceedings and the reasons in reaching a decision. 
Reasons for the decision, written in a proper manner, should be included so 
that the party can comprehend and if possible to accept the validity of the 
factual and legal grounds, which led to the authority in dealing with the case 
issuing a decision’25. 
This has a variety of impacts, for example, it should convince all parties 
that officials dealt fairly with the matter and that no decision was taken in 
an arbitrary manner, but only after considering all the circumstances. It also 
serves to show the decision-making mechanism, a description of actions taken 
and determines the motives of the government. At the same time, reasoning 
shows that the settlement is fair and beneficial, even if it has been unsuccessful, 
and that the party should be interested in the voluntary implementation of 
the imposed obligations. 
One of the most important barriers to the development of competition 
in the market is a lack of proper separation of competitive activities from 
regulated activities in energy companies. In support of his decisions the 
URE President raised the problem of the lack of preparation for the actual 
implementation of the opening of the energy market to the public through 
free choice of energy supplier granted under Article 4j of the Energy Law,. In 
fact, the blame for this state of affairs should be laid at the URE President’s 
door, who by law is required to promote competition (Article 21 of the Energy 
Law). There is currently no clear information as to the state of the market for 
participants, neither is there any information regarding the ‘level of readiness of 
consumers’. Today the market means some kind of agreement between sellers 
and buyers, in which the supply by sellers, and demand of buyers is the price. 
The conditions of perfect competition in economic terms are a theoretical 
model of market and competition, which include assumptions that none of 
the market participants (consumers, companies, etc.) are able to influence the 
market price. This state can be achieved when certain important conditions are 
met, such as a large number of relatively small market participants, excellent 
portability factor, and full transparency of the market. This is something that 
economists would call ‘pure and perfect competition, namely, when the set 
of following four conditions are met by the market: atomization, uniformity, 
transparency, and liquidity. 
25 E. Ochendowski Postępowania administracyjne i postępowanie przed sądem administra-
cyjnym, Wyd. Comer, Toruń 1995, p. 58.
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However, because of the insufficient preparation of buyers (consumers) and 
their level of awareness of their rights, as so often indicated by the URE, there 
is no economic theory relevant for assessing the competitiveness of the market.
It is worth mentioning that the issue of prices, which are set below the cost 
of purchasing power, has already been noted in foreign literature. Experts have 
recognized the danger in such tariff regulation stating that if the prices are 
regulated below-cost this will eventually lead to a situation in which potential 
competitors are not interested in entering the market – which means that 
energy companies will not have equal access to customers26.
The European Commission also shares the opinion that the Polish market is 
not yet free and that there have been infringements of EC law. A memorandum 
from June 25, 200927 states that: (i) the regulated end-user price should be the 
exception and not the principle of a competitive market, (ii) price regulation 
may lead to the inhibition of the development of the electricity market, (iii) 
The regulated prices are justified by public service obligations (see the memo 
regarding the European Commission’s allegations against Greece, Lithuania, 
and Romania). However disputes continuously endure as to whether the 
obligation of tariff approval for recipients receiving electric power and natural 
gas for private domestic needs is necessary. 
V. Conclusions
In most European countries there are still questions regarding end-user 
price regulation and whether there has been progress made towards fully 
deregulated markets. Price regulation is one indicator for market analysis, but 
of course there are many other relevant indicators which should be taken into 
account to obtain a complete full.28 As of the January 1, 2010, regulated end-
user prices still exist in quite a large proportion of countries in the electricity 
and natural gas market segments. Between 2008 and 2010, little progress 
regarding end-user price regulation removal can be seen in the various market 
26 C.W. Jones EU Energy Law, The Internal Energy Market, Vol 1, Second Edition, Claeys 
& Casteels, Leuven, 2004, p. 239.
27 MEMO/09/296.
28 ERGEG Draft GGP on indicators for retail market monitoring. Ref: E09-RMF-14-04, 16 
April 2010 http://www.energyregulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/
OPEN%20PUBLIC%20CONSULTATIONS/GGP%20retail%20market%20monitoring/CD/
E09-RMF-14-04_Draft%20GGP-IRMM_PC_16-Apr-10.pdf Status review of End-User Price 
Regulation as of 1 January 2010.
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segments. The small improvements noticed mainly concern the medium to 
large businesses segment and the energy intensive industry segment.
In most of the countries with end-user regulated prices, the proportion of 
eligible customers supplied at regulated prices is more than 80%, for each 
segment considered, indicating a lack of competition in the retail market. 
This share is close to 100% for the domestic segment. This figure is often 
smaller for larger customers. The reasons why customers do not switch 
from regulated prices to free market prices, e.g., lack of competitive offers, 
lower regulated prices than free market prices, no possibility to switch back 
to regulated prices, lack of confidence in the market or little information 
on market functioning, was not covered in the survey. As of January 1, 
2010, 5 countries with price regulation have adopted a road-map towards 
a competitive market without end-user price regulation in electricity; and 
1 country in natural gas. It should be noted that these road-maps in most 
cases do not concern all market segments with end-user regulated prices. In 
particular, domestic segments are often not covered. In addition, some road-
maps do not give a specific removal date and time-schedule for regulated 
prices.
In more than two-thirds of the EU countries, the regulator sets or approves 
end-user regulated prices. In approximately one-fifth of the countries for 
electricity and one-fourth of the countries for natural gas, the decision to 
remove end-user price regulation lies with the regulator. A general conclusion 
can be drawn showing that compared to 2008 there has not been much 
improvement towards competitive energy-markets without price regulation 
within the EU. This is especially true for the domestic segment where a high 
proportion of countries still have price regulation. In addition, hardly any 
road-maps towards the removal of price regulation are in place. This may 
be because the European Directives leave a lot of room for interpretation 
regarding price regulation for domestic users. Indeed, a recent judgment of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case 265/08, 20 April 2010) 
confirms that end-user price regulation, under certain restrictive conditions, is 
as a temporary measure, in compliance with the Directives. ERGEG reiterates 
its call for road-maps to phase out end-user regulated prices in the EU’s 
Member States. ERGEG recognizes that competition also requires careful 
supervision, to ensure that customers are treated fairly, get the best possible 
deal available and are enabled to exercise their right to choose in an open 
market. Regulated prices can not only distort the functioning of the competitive 
market, but can also hinder the goal of customer protection and participation. 
Whilst protecting vulnerable customers is also of particular importance, social 
measures with that aim should be in line with market principles. ERGEG 
calls on all market participants to promote the efficient functioning of the 
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European energy markets and to facilitate the development of competition 
in the energy consumer’s interest.
Obviously here one may dispute the notion of competitiveness of the energy 
market bearing in mind such factors as the appropriate number of participants, 
position of the enterprise with the specified market share; market entry and 
exit barriers; homogeneity in trade in goods or services; transparency of 
structure and operating principles; legal equality and principles of availability 
of market information to participants; control and supervision preventing cartel 
development (market fixing); accessibility of highly productive technology.29 
However, it is clearly stipulated that a Member State may maintain the 
procedure of tariff approval, if it supports the implementation of the general 
commercial interest consisting of maintaining delivery prices of natural gas to 
final recipients at a realistic level. Member States are obliged to agree among 
themselves – with regard to the situation of the natural gas sector – objectives 
in the form of liberalization and also essential end-user protection, as indicated 
in Directive 2003/55 and the new Directive of the European Parliament and 
the Council 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal natural gas 
and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC.
The distribution tariff should be approved by URE President because it 
is a natural monopoly, but the tariffs concerning end-users should be free 
from confirmation even for households. In conclusion it is our opinion that 
excessive state interference in the regulation of prices for selling energy and 
in the future for distribution in the longer term does not provide improved 
protection of consumers. It is obvious that what was confirmed in the judgment 
of ETS is that price regulation primarily concerns households. If it concerns 
the non-discriminatory nature of the discussed obligation, the task of the URE 
President should be such a definition of prices so that there could be no 
accusations of discriminatory activity mostly within the area of distribution. 
That would always be the case if this type of intervention were to be conducted 
by the URE President to place the financial burden primarily on commercial 
enterprises. Obviously price regulation by the approval of tariffs by the URE 
President is intended to serve the general commercial interest consisting of 
maintaining prices to end-users at a reasonable level, bearing in mind the fact 
that EU Member States are obliged to reconcile objectives in the form of 
liberalization and essential protection of end-users, this being the very objective 
of the directive. Therefore the role of the national regulatory authority in the 
area of natural monopoly is the creation of a surrogate competitive market in 
the field of distribution. On condition of separating the regulatory activity from 
the activity performed in the competitive market, the task may be performed 
29 Raport UOKiK. Kierunki rozwoju konkurencji i ochrony konsumentów w polskim sektorze 
elektroenergetycznym, Warszawa 2010 www.uokik.gov.pl.
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by the introduction of direct competition (comparative), where analogous 
activity is performed by such a large number of enterprises, that statistical 
assessment instruments may be applied.30 The URE President in compliance 
with the law analyses and verifies costs, on the basis of financial reports and 
material-financial plans of energy enterprises, bearing in mind the creation of 
conditions for competitiveness and the promotion of efficiency in commercial 
activity and also in particular applying comparative methods in the assessment 
of the efficiency of energy enterprises undertaking the same type of activity 
in comparable circumstances but of course in the area of distribution. So 
we can conclude that these two types of tariffs in particular for end-users 
should be not approved by the URE President and the second for distribution 
should stay in the same scheme as it is regulated right now – approved by the 
URE President. One may then with confidence state that this market is more 
competitive, and free from end-user tariffs imposed by the URE President.
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